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THE BUCK STOPS WHERE?
A CRITIQUE OF VICARIOUS
LIABILITY IN THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CONTEXT
C. J. COLWELL†
In Canadian tort law, liability is almost always linked to some notion of fault,
save for a few well-established exceptions. By far the most common exception is
vicarious liability, i.e. the liability of employers for the torts of their employees.
In its 1999 ruling in Bazley v. Curry, the Supreme Court of Canada articulated
exactly why this kind of faultless liability exists in Canada, and how it is
justified.
In medical malpractice cases involving teaching hospitals, there are usually
three possible defendants to a negligence action: the attending physician, the
treating resident, and the hospital. Due to the legal nature of their employment
relationship, if the resident is found liable, so too is her employer, the hospital.
This liability is regardless of fault. The attending physician, on the other hand,
can only be held liable with fault.
This paper proposes that imposing vicarious liability on the hospital or any
other party in this type of action is inconsistent with the justifications outlined
in Bazley v. Curry. Liability in this particular context, it is argued, should be
limited to liability with fault.
This paper also briefly explores possible reasons why the courts have
demonstrated a general preference to have hospitals, rather than attending
physicians, pay judgments to injured plaintiffs. It takes notice of a newly
emerging non-delegable duty of care owed by hospitals to patients, and further
points out the unique public source of funding for malpractice judgments
regardless of who is liable.
† C.J. Colwell is a second year LL.B. candidate at Dalhousie Law School, and will be
clerking for the Chief Justice of New Brunswick in 2009.
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INTRODUCTION: INTUITIVE QUESTIONS AND
LEGAL INCONSISTENCIES

On May 30th, 1997, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal (NLCA) delivered
its ruling in Kielley v. General Hospital Corp.1 The appeal involved a hospital
found vicariously liable for the negligent harm caused by a resident in its
employ. Relying upon the 1982 Nova Scotia case Considine v. Camp Hill
Hospital, the hospital pled that the attending physician, supervising the
resident and ultimately responsible for the welfare of the patient, should also
have been held vicariously liable. 2
The hospital’s position, intuitively, makes a lot of sense. A hospital is a
fictional entity, and while fictional entities (like corporations, for example)
are quite often found liable at law, in this case, it was the attending physician
who actually admitted the patient, supervised the resident, and was the
instrument by which the hospital enforced the quality of care. He was an
independent contractor with “hospital privileges,” and was directing the
resident towards the ends of his own private enterprise. He was billing the
provincial health authority for the patient’s care. He was the fully qualified
individual medically responsible for the patient for the entire length of
his admittance; he could quite reasonably be expected to bear some of
the responsibility for the patient’s loss. The expert medical witnesses who
testified at trial voiced similar concerns.3
The Court found that this was not the case at law. It found that the attending
physician, by no means the employer of the resident, could not be found
vicariously liable for the negligent harm caused by the resident under his
supervision. The hospital, on the other hand, employing the resident, was
easily found to be vicariously liable, and thus jointly and severally liable with
the resident for the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
Kielley v. General Hospital Corp. [1997] N.J. No. 123 (N.L.C.A.) (QL) [Kielley].
Considine et al. v. Camp Hill Hospital et al. (1982), 133 D.L.R. (3d) 11 (N.S.S.C.) (QL)
[Considine].
3
Supra note 1 ¶ 30.
1
2
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The focus of this project is whether this decision accurately reflects the law in
Canada. Vicarious liability has a long history in the common law, and since
the 1999 Supreme Court of Canada case Bazley v. Curry, Canadian common
law has had an explicit articulation of why it exists at all.4 The operation of
and the justifications for vicarious liability are intriguing, but in cases like
Kielley and Considine, they are ultimately problematic. Insofar as vicarious
liability operates in the medical malpractice context, I argue that finding the
hospital vicariously liable - that is, liable without fault - is inconsistent with
the goals of and justifications for that very liability. In particular, substantial
problems arise over both the possibility of future deterrence, as well as
providing just and fair compensation when vicarious liability is applied in
the medical malpractice context. In addition, there has occasionally been
insufficient separation between the two very separate legal issues of faultless
vicarious liability, and breaches of direct duties of care leading to liability
with fault.
In order to demonstrate this legal phenomenon, we shall begin with an
exploration of vicarious liability in general as it exists in Canada. Then, we
shall examine the relationships, legal and otherwise, between residents,
physicians, and hospitals.5 In doing so, we shall demonstrate that, while
Kielley may have been rightly decided based upon previous case law,
vicarious liability in the medical malpractice context is inconsistent with its
own justifications in Canadian law. Finally, I will propose possible solutions
to this legal inconsistency, and then briefly consider the relatively new
emergence of a possible non-delegable duty of care owed by hospitals to
individual patients.

Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 [Curry].
It must be stated at the outset that we are confining ourselves to dealing only with the
vicarious liability that currently operates between hospitals, physicians, and residents, and
are not venturing to say what our conclusions might entail for other healthcare workers
such as nurses, alternative practitioners, or hospital custodial staff.
4
5
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I: VICARIOUS LIABILITY: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Operation
Before continuing, it is important to articulate exactly the kind of liability we
are talking about. By vicarious liability, we are referring to legal liability for
the acts of another without fault. The employer (or other liable party) does
not need to be at fault for vicarious liability to operate. If an employer fails to
supervise adequately, does not take proper steps to ensure the quality of the
employee during hiring, does not provide proper instruction or equipment,
or in any other way falls below the requisite standard of care, then liability
is direct and lies in negligence. Liability with fault is also in effect when an
employer, while meeting the standard of care in its own actions, owes a nondelegable duty of care to the plaintiff that was subsequently breached by an
employee (and so, was breached by the employer). Vicarious liability kicks
in when the tortfeasor-employee was at fault, and the employer has met its
own standard of care, but is nevertheless found liable. It is much easier to
internally justify vicarious liability if it is somehow linked to fault, but this
must be avoided. The only “fault” that exists linking the employer to the
harm caused by the employee is that the harm must have been caused via a
tort. What we are talking about in this project is liability without fault, for
the acts of another, in a negligence action.
Despite our intuitive sense that liability should somehow be linked to fault,
vicarious liability is firmly entrenched in the common law, and has been
for over three hundred years. The 1698 case of Jones v. Hart articulates the
law of respondeat superior (“let the superior answer”), the legal ancestor of
vicarious liability:
The action well lies in this case: If the servants of A, with
his cart run against another cart, wherein is a pipe of wine,
and overturn the cart and spoil the wine, an action lieth
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against A. So where a carter’s servant runs his cart over a
boy, action lies against the master for the damage done by
this negligence: and so it is if a smith’s man pricks a horse in
shoeing the master is liable. For whoever employs another,
is answerable for him, and undertakes for his care to all
that make use of him.
The act of a servant is the act of his master, where he acts by
authority of the master.6
Strict liability in general is a relative anomaly in the common law. According
to P.S. Atiyah:
[I]n the modern law of torts liability is still generally based
on some notion of ‘fault.’ A person is not, subject to well
known exceptions, generally liable in tort except where he
has intentionally or negligently caused some loss or damage
to the plaintiff.7
As mentioned above, vicarious liability is not strict per se, as the servant
(henceforth used interchangeably with “employee”) must have committed
an initial tort. Non-tortious harms caused by the employee will not suffice.
However, once this has been established, then the master (employer) will
also be liable, regardless of personal intent or negligence. It cannot be
stressed enough that, contrary to general tort principles, vicarious liability is
imposed without fault.
After the commission of an initial tort, there are two more requirements
necessary for vicarious liability to operate. First, there must be a relationship
between the tortfeasor and the defendant that gives rise to the liability.
Second, that relationship must somehow be connected to the commission of
the tort.8 By far, the relationship most likely to give rise to vicarious liability is
that of employer and employee. Independent contractor and principal-agent
6
7
8

Jones v. Hart (1698), 90 E.R. 1255 (K.B.) at 1255.
P. S. Atiyah, Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (London: Butterworths, 1967) at 3.
Ibid.
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relationships can sometimes create this kind of liability as well, though for
our purposes only independent contractors and employment relationships
are relevant.9
The key factor for determining whether or not an employment or pseudoemployment relationship exists was traditionally the degree of control
exercised by one party over the other.10 This criterion is quite effective when
dealing with simple employment relationships. For example, if one were to
open up a transport-trucking business, and hire a driver to deliver various
goods, then it would logically follow that the employer would be liable for
the negligent harms caused by the driver. The employer can dictate when
the driver travels, how she shall drive, the timings she has to meet, and
can establish that any failure to observe these instructions could result in
dismissal. There is a clear element of control exercised by the company over
the employee sufficient to invoke vicarious liability (we will visit why this is
so below, when justifications for vicarious liability are discussed).
However, as Weinrib notes:
[t]his test of employment has been found to be difficult
to apply to skilled workers and professionals, such as
physicians working for hospitals, where the employer
coordinates the work but cannot plausibly be said to direct
the manner in which it is executed.11
Consider our trucking scenario. If the owner is not a trucker herself, and
coordinates the shipping of the goods but has no real say in the manner in
which the driver delivers them, this kind of problem may exist. The driver
being a totally independent enterprise may further complicate it; if she owns
her own truck and merely ships goods for the owner, what is the degree
of control then? Addressing concerns such as these, “courts have more
recently moved to the ‘organization’ test, which asks in effect whether the
Ibid.
Ernest J. Weinrib, Tort Law (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) at 662.
11
Ibid at 661.
9

10
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supposed employee is a cog in the defendant’s organizational machinery.”12
Lord Denning commented in Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. Macdonald
and Evans that an employee is employed as part of the business, and his
work is done as an integral part of the business, whereas the work of an
independent contractor “although done for the business, is not integrated
into it but is only accessory to it.”13
However, this liability for employers is limited. The tort must have been
committed within the “scope” of employment. The employer is not
unconditionally vicariously liable for the acts of the employee. In Jones
v. Hart,14 above, Holt C.J. articulates that the act must be “by authority of
the master.” The master is not liable if the employee was “on a frolic of his
own.”15
This aspect of vicarious liability has been litigated recently in Canada in
the cases of Bazley v. Curry16 and Jacobi	

     v.	

     Grifﬁths,17 and in the U.K. in
Lister v. Hesley Hall.18 All of these cases dealt with institutional sexual abuse
of children. The Courts’ decisions on what conduct was legally within the
employee’s “scope of employment” were eclectic, but rotated around the
basic elements of the “Salmond Test,” i.e. “that a wrongful act is deemed to
be done by a ‘servant’ in the course of his employment if ‘it is either (a) a
wrongful act authorized by the master, or (b) a wrongful and unauthorized
mode of doing some act authorized by the master.’”19
The exact definition of the acts under type (b) was extremely important in all
three of those cases, but is of little concern in the vast majority of cases with
Ibid.
Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison v. Macdonald and Evans, [1952] 1 T.L.R. 101 at 111
[Evans].
14
Supra note 6.
15
Joel v. Morison (1834), 172 E.R. 1338 (Ex.) as per Parke B., reproduced in Weinrib, supra
note 10.
16
Supra note 4.
17
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 570 [Jacobi].
18
[2001] 2 All E.R. 769 (HL) [Lister].
19
Supra note 18, as per Lord Steyn quoting J.W. Salmond in Salmond on Torts (London:
Stevens and Haynes, 1907) at 83.
12
13

8

Vicarious Liability in Medical Malpractice

2008

which this current project is concerned. We are here dealing with vicarious
liability in the medical malpractice, i.e. negligence, context. Whether or not
a hospital would be found vicariously liable for a resident/employee who
sexually battered a patient would seem to be unsettled, judging by the Supreme
Court of Canada’s relatively inconsistent judgments in Curry and Jacobi.20 It
would be difficult to imagine sexual battery as being an unauthorized mode
of delivering medical care, though Curry might indicate otherwise.21
In any case, the tort committed and whether or not the act would pass
this part of the test for vicarious liability is relatively moot, considering
we are concerned here with the operation of vicarious liability in the
medical malpractice context as a whole and whether it is justified at all.
The core issue of this paper is not the nature of the act, but, rather, the
fundamental justifications for vicarious liability and the courts’ arguably
unjustified application of it. Henceforth, it will be taken as a given that any
tort committed by either a physician or a resident while treating a patient
would be considered to satisfy the Salmond test, though we will be focusing
primarily upon negligence. Negligent medical treatment, in any case, would
seem to qualify quite easily under the principles set out in Curry and Jacobi, as
medical treatment clearly falls within the scope of employment of healthcare
professionals.
We have thus far shown the basic legal elements of vicarious liability as it
operates in Canadian law: (1) there must be a relationship which gives rise to a
master-servant dynamic (almost always employment, sometimes independent
contractors); (2) there must be a tort committed by the servant/ employee; and
(3) that tort must have been committed within the scope of employment.

In Curry, supra note 4, the Supreme Court unanimously found that sexual battery
within a school’s grounds gave rise to vicarious liability. In Jacobi, supra note 17, it found
by a 4-3 split decision that, despite the fact that the relationships between all the parties
were remarkably similar to those in Curry, the same tort committed in a private home did
not give rise to vicarious liability. The decisions were delivered on the same day.
21
See also Weingerl v. Seo, [2005] O.J. No. 2467, 256 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.), where a
clinic employee, an ultrasound technologist, sexually battered a patient who came in for
an ultrasound. The clinic was found vicariously liable.
20
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Justification
Explaining the operation of vicarious liability in Canada solicits the question:
why does it exist at all? As stated above, liability of any kind, be it civil or
criminal, is almost always connected to some socially acceptable element
of fault. Once the criteria are satisfied, vicarious liability will indemnify
a master against a plaintiff regardless of any fault element, intentional or
negligent (though recovery through these avenues is not closed to the
plaintiff, so long as she can prove that the hospital breached the standard of
care or committed the intentional tort).
In Bazley v. Curry, McLachlin J. (as she then was) gave a lengthy and extremely
useful exegesis of the justifications for vicarious liability in Canadian
law.22 Though, as stated above, that case turned upon the issue of scope of
employment (as well as the faultless liability of charitable organizations),
her survey of the justifications for vicarious liability is generally taken to be
authoritative.23
There are arguably two legal justifications for the existence of vicarious
liability. Both are based purely upon policy concerns. The justifications are:
(1) deterrence; and (2) fair compensation.24 I would further divide the second
point into three categories: (a) satisfaction, i.e. that it is fair and just that the
plaintiff have access to a solvent defendant (“deep pockets” compensation);
(b) risk creation, i.e. that it is fair and just that those that create the risk
should bear the loss; and (c) loss-spreading.
These ideals were espoused by LaForest J. in London Drugs, where he was
determined to prevent employers from exporting liability to employees
despite contract law that seemed to provide otherwise.25 He found justification
Supra note 4.
Dalhousie Law School teaches vicarious liability in its Business Associations classes
using Bazley v. Curry, for example. See also 3464920 Canada Inc. v. Strother. 2005 BCCA
385.
24
Curry, supra note 4 ¶ 29.
25
London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 [London
Drugs].
22
23
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for vicarious liability in the policy considerations above, and McLachlin J.
approved of them in Curry:
Faced with the absence in the existing law of a coherent
principle to explain vicarious liability, La Forest J. found
its basis in policy (at p. 336): “the vicarious liability regime
is best seen as a response to a number of policy concerns.
In its traditional domain, these are primarily linked to
compensation, deterrence and loss internalization.”
Fleming has identified similar policies lying at the heart of
vicarious liability. In his view, two fundamental concerns
underlie the imposition of vicarious liability: (1) provision
of a just and practical remedy for the harm; and (2)
deterrence of future harm. While different formulations of
the policy interests at stake may be made (for example, loss
internalization is a hybrid of the two), I believe that these
two ideas usefully embrace the [page553] main policy
considerations that have been advanced.26

Fair Compensation
McLachlin J. goes on to explain each of the two justifications in detail,
beginning with fair compensation’s sub-category (a) satisfaction:
First and foremost is the concern to provide a just and
practical remedy to people who suffer as a consequence of
wrongs perpetrated by an employee… This policy interest
embraces a number of subsidiary goals. The first is the goal of
effective compensation. “One of the most important social
goals served by vicarious liability is victim compensation.
Supra note 4, ¶ 28-29, McLachlin J. citing LaForest J. in London Drugs, ibid., and John
G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed. (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1998).
26
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Vicarious liability improves the chances that the victim
can recover the judgment from a solvent defendant. (B.
Feldthusen, “Vicarious Liability for Sexual Torts”, in Torts
Tomorrow (1998), 221, at p. 224.) Or to quote Fleming, the
master is “a more promising source of recompense than his
servant who is apt to be a man of straw” (p. 410).27
Returning to our trucking scenario, let us assume our employee-driver
negligently falls asleep at the wheel of a truck while transporting cans of cola
and crashes into a family of four that is non-negligently travelling by car on
a family vacation. The two children are rendered quadriplegic. The parents
sue the driver and company. The driver is found negligent and liable, the
company is found not negligent (i.e. it met its requisite standard of care and
is not at fault).
It would seem likely that the lone truck driver, on her meager salary, would not
be able to pay the total damages awarded in compensation for two children
rendered quadriplegic. The company, on the other hand, has significantly
greater assets. It would be rather unjust for the family to go uncompensated
simply because the driver cannot afford to pay (and is indeed physically
unable to pay). Vicarious liability, justified under satisfaction, could solve
this dilemma.
Atiyah is critical of this doctrine of “satisfaction” applied on its own:
After all there will always be plenty of people in the world
better able to pay damages than any particular defendant
who may be unfortunate enough to be sued for a tort, but
mere wealth… could never by itself be treated as a ground
for imposing liability in tort.28

Supra note 4 ¶ 30, McLachlin J. citing B. Feldthusen, “Vicarious Liability for Sexual
Torts”, in Nicholas J. Mullany and Allen M. Linden, eds., Torts	

    Tomorrow:	

    A	

    Tribute	

    to	

    
John	

    Fleming (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1998) at 224, and John G. Fleming,
The Law of Torts, 9th ed. (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1998).
28
Supra note 7, at 22.
27

Vicarious Liability in Medical Malpractice

12

2008

However, he considers also that the law must not be an abstract academic
creation that never cashes out in reality (literally and figuratively). Combined
with other justifications, such as loss spreading or deterrence, “satisfaction”
may have a place.29
The second component of fair compensation, viz. (b) risk creation, is closely
related to this idea. Engaging in an enterprise, whether for profit or not,
invariably creates risks that would not exist otherwise. Creating these risks
is not in itself enough to attract liability; however, it still seems intuitively
just and fair that the entity that creates the risk should bear the loss once
a tort has been committed. LaForest J. in London Drugs tapped into this
particular concern: “a person, typically a corporation, who employs others
to advance its own economic interest should in fairness be placed under a
corresponding liability for losses incurred in the course of the enterprise.”30
McLachlin J. continues this common law justification in Curry:
Effective compensation must also be fair, in the sense that
it must seem just to place liability for the wrong on the
employer. Vicarious liability is arguably fair in this sense.
The employer puts in the community an enterprise which
carries with it certain risks. When those risks materialize
and cause injury to a member of the public despite the
employer’s reasonable efforts, it is fair that the person or
organization that creates the enterprise and hence the risk
should bear the loss. This accords with the notion that it is
right and just that the person who creates a risk bear the
loss when the risk ripens into harm. While the fairness of
this proposition is capable of standing alone, it is buttressed
by the fact that the employer is often in the best position to
spread the losses through mechanisms like insurance and
higher prices, thus minimizing the dislocative effect of the
tort within society.31
29
30
31

Ibid.
Supra note 25 ¶ 50.
Supra note 4 ¶ 31.
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The truck driver employee has not created the risks associated with her
transporting pop cans. She is merely working for her salary and participating
in the risk of this one act. The company, on the other hand, is sending this
truck on numerous trips, all of which are to serve the ends of the company
(whether for profit or not is irrelevant: Curry makes this quite clear). As
Atiyah says:
The master [then] is to be treated as a sort of holder of
an equity in the servant though an equity with unlimited
liability; after paying the servant his wages and ‘fringe
benefits,’ the master takes what is left, whether it is profit or
loss, arising from the servant’s work.32
It would be unjust if a company could escape liability for the harms resulting
from the risks it has created by exporting it to the individual employees
actually carrying out the tasks to achieve the company’s ends: “[T]he feeling
that one who derives a benefit from an act should also bear the risk of loss
from the same act is probably a deep-rooted one which has played its part in
the formulation of the modern law.”33
In her comments above, McLachlin J. touches on the third component of fair
compensation viz. (c) loss spreading. She is far from alone in considering
this a valid justification for imposing liability. Atiyah writes:
The most widely held view among modern American
writers is that vicarious liability is justified by the
principle of loss-distribution. In the great majority
of cases an employer who has to pay damages for the
torts of his servants does not in fact have to meet these
liabilities out of his own pocket. The cost of the liabilities
is distributed over a large section of the community,
and spread over some period of time. This occurs
partly because of the practice of insurance, and partly
32
33

Supra note 7, at 18.
Ibid.

Vicarious Liability in Medical Malpractice

14

2008

because most employers are anyhow not individuals but
corporations.34
The trucking company is likely to be in a much better position to purchase
insurance (though, in our scenario, it may be presumed that the driver
herself is required to be insured, up to a point. This interesting variable will
be revisited below in sections 2-4). The company can “spread the loss” in
this manner, such that it is not borne totally by the plaintiff family, nor the
defendant driver, but rather in small amounts by all the insurance company’s
premium payers. Even if the company is not insured, the cost will be borne
by many shareholders, and will be accommodated by a combination of
raised prices on products and services and a lower profit margin. The fair
compensation justification presumes it is more just to spread a loss widely
through the community rather than have it borne entirely by any one member,
especially the harmed plaintiff, but also the lone defendant employee, (at
least in our case of a negligent accident: intentional torts might call this into
question based upon some notion of retribution).
So, linked together in fair compensation, are three principles that, when
operating together, compose half of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
justification for imposing this liability without fault: (a) satisfaction; (b) risk
creation; and (c) loss-spreading.
It is important to mention that fair compensation in its entirety depends
upon some moral notion of what is fair and just. It is very much rooted in a
moral argument. The idea that the innocent plaintiff deserves compensation
for her harm, that the entity that creates the risk should bear the loss, and
that it is more fair to spread the loss rather than have it concentrated are all
directly linked to some notion of social justice. Fair compensation, severed
from deterrence, is not linked at all to any economic reality (save, perhaps,
an argument that loss-spreading is somehow economically efficient). It is
pure “deep-pockets” reasoning, based upon the logical fallacy of appeal to
pity (do we not all pity our unfortunate family of four who have had to suffer
so much at the hands of the large, faceless trucking company?). It is not an
34

Ibid. at 22-23.
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objective justification for faultless liability while it exists totally independent
of some other means of imposing legal (vice moral or ethical) liability. As
Coleman succinctly writes, “no one seriously believes that all victims deserve
to be compensated for their losses… even victims who do not deserve to
suffer may have no right to repair. Compensation simpliciter is not a goal of
tort law.”35

Deterrence
The other half of vicarious liability’s justification provides the real-world
grounding for fair compensation:
The policy grounds supporting the imposition of vicarious
liability - fair compensation and deterrence - are related.
The policy consideration of deterrence is linked to the
policy consideration of fair compensation based on the
employer’s introduction or enhancement of a risk. The
introduction of the enterprise into the community with its
attendant risk, in turn, implies the possibility of managing
the risk to minimize the costs of the harm that may flow
from it.36
The idea behind this doctrine is that by imposing liability, the courts can
compel the employer to manage the risk and ensure that future torts are
avoided, or at the very least occur less. McLachlin J. continues her legal
justification for vicarious liability in Curry:
The second major policy consideration underlying
vicarious liability is deterrence of future harm. Fixing the
employer with responsibility for the employee’s wrongful
act, even where the employer is not negligent, may have a
35
36

Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (Cambridge: University Press, 1992) at 209.
Supra note 4 ¶ 34.
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deterrent effect. Employers are often in a position to reduce
accidents and intentional wrongs by efficient organization
and supervision. Failure to take such measures may not
suffice to establish a case of tortious negligence directly
against the employer. Perhaps the harm cannot be shown
to have been foreseeable under negligence law. Perhaps
the employer can avail itself of the defence of compliance
with the industry standard. Or perhaps the employer, while
complying with the standard of reasonable care, was not as
scrupulously diligent as it might feasibly have been.37
For Richard Posner, the concept of deterrence is the only justification for
vicarious liability, though the connection to fair compensation still lingers:
The reason for the employer’s liability is that most employees
lack the resources to pay a judgment if they injure someone
seriously. They therefore are not very responsive to the
threat of tort liability. The employer, however, can induce
them to be careful, as by firing or otherwise penalizing
them for their carelessness… Making the employer liable
for his employees’ torts will give him an incentive to use
such inducements.38
The effectiveness of vicarious liability in promoting deterrence is open to
considerable criticism, most notably from a law and economics perspective.
According to that theory, the only measures the employer will take in order
to prevent accidents are those that are cost effective. Companies will always
act within the “Learned Hand” model for reasonable care, and indeed must if
they are rational self-maximizers. They will spend no more and take no more
care (burden “B”) than is justified, taking into account the costs of the tortious
harms (liability “L”), multiplied by the likelihood they will occur (probability
“P”). A company, in maximizing returns, will only logically spend up to B

Ibid. at ¶ 32
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th Ed. (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2007)
at 188.
37
38
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so long as B < PL. This is, in fact, a possible definition of reasonable care.39
It makes good business sense, and is totally rational when one removes the
logical fallacy of appeal to pity. If the costs of reducing accidents were to rise
beyond the amount expected to be paid out in judgments, no company in
reality would ever pay it.
Imposing vicarious liability increases L, thus allowing for an economically
justifiable increase in B. That notwithstanding, the most efficient balance
between increases in spending and the lowering of committed torts will
remain the most reasonable choice.
McLachlin J. mentions in the passage above that in order to effect deterrence,
the employer must be found vicariously liable. Otherwise, the employer
might escape direct liability (and therefore not be motivated to deter) by
claiming the harm was not foreseeable, or that it took all reasonable care (the
industry standard).40 In other words, it might escape liability by being found
faultless. It is questionable, however, whether the imposition of vicarious
liability will change overall behavior, as reasonable care, i.e. spending the
maximum amount of B such that B is still < PL, will always be the prevailing
practice. Further, how can an employer be expected to deter harms that were
not reasonably foreseeable in the first place? Whether through direct or
vicarious liability, B is the maximum, and constant, amount employers will
spend in order to deter their employees from committing torts. It is unlikely
that the threat of liability without fault will ever increase the employer’s
deterrent steps beyond the reasonable care formula. Some authors have
argued that vicarious liability actually discourages employers from taking
deterrent measures.41

United States v. Carrol Towing Co., 159 F.2d. 169 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge Learned Hand, as
cited in Weinrib, supra note 10 at 68.
40
Supra note 37.
41
See Jennifer H. Arlen and W. Bentley MacLeod, “Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of
Vicarious Liability,” in M. Stuart Madden, ed., Exploring Tort Law. (Cambridge: University
Press, 2005). The authors argue that vicarious liability does not, overall, compel employers
to be extra diligent in preventing accidents, but rather encourages them to “outsource”
liability by using independent contractors.
39
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What may serve to justify vicarious liability, however, is that by increasing the
scope of employers’ liability, i.e. by making them liable for their employees’
torts, the courts increase both P and L, and therefore increase the total
justifiable amount of B. In addition, the employer need not owe the plaintiff
any direct duty of care: the trucking company will still be liable, even though
it was the driver who owed the family of four a direct duty of care. So, there
should conceivably be some decrease in the occurrence of harms.
It would not seem necessary to provide a lengthy justification for why
negligent harms are undesirable and must be deterred. Whether from a
justice perspective, invoking rights-based arguments of non-interference, or
from an economic efficiency point of view arguing for the most efficient use
of resources in order to maximize wealth, there exists at the core of tort law
the notion that harms, i.e. losses, should be avoided.
Deterrence and fair compensation are thus the two prevailing Canadian
justifications for imposing liability without fault upon employers (or other
pseudo-employers) for the acts of their employees. It is worth noting that, as
mentioned above, the two principles work together in order to ground vicarious
liability in reality. Indeed, vicarious liability really only seems justifiable in
situations where they are both applicable. McLachlin J. in Curry agrees:
A wrong that is only coincidentally linked to the activity
of the employer and duties of the employee cannot justify
the imposition of vicarious liability on the employer. To
impose vicarious liability on the employer for such a wrong
does not respond to common sense notions of fairness. Nor
does it serve to deter future harms. Because the wrong is
essentially independent of the employment situation, there
is little the employer could have done to prevent it. Where
vicarious liability is not closely and materially related to a
risk introduced or enhanced by the employer, it serves no
deterrent purpose, and relegates the employer to the status
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of an involuntary insurer.42
It may be logical, then, to conclude that vicarious liability, in its legal
application and operation as discussed above, should only kick in when both
of its goals and justifications are applicable. As McLachlin J. concluded:
[A] meaningful articulation of when vicarious liability
should follow in new situations ought to be animated by the
twin policy goals of fair compensation and deterrence that
underlie the doctrine, rather than by artificial or semantic
distinctions.43

II: THE MEDICAL ORGANIZATION: PHYSICIANS,
RESIDENTS, MASTERS AND SERVANTS

Our particular project is focused upon the justiciability of vicarious liability
in the medical malpractice context. We are concerned, therefore, with the
kinds of relationships that exist in that circumstance.
Lahey concisely notes:
The vast majority of health care services in Canada
are received from care providers who work either as
independent professionals in private practice or as the
employees of health care institutions or firms that are
controlled and operated by independent corporate
bodies.44
Supra note 4 ¶ 36.
Supra note 4 ¶ 36.
44
William Lahey, “Medicare and the Law: Contours of an Evolving Relationship.” in
Jocelyn Downie & Timothy Caulfied & Colleen Flood, eds., Canadian Health Law and
42
43
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Hospitals in Canada are creatures of statute. They are established by
provincial acts under constitutional authority,45 and regulated by provincial
bylaws, or other subordinate legislation, passed pursuant to those acts.46 As
stated above, the statutes generally establish the hospital as an independent
corporate body, which is not legally considered a government entity,
although it is paid for by the government and is effecting a government
policy.47 Provincial governments regulate through statute, provide funding
for “medically necessary” procedures, and articulate general guiding
principles for all statute created not-for-profit hospitals and occasionally
even for-profit private clinics.48
Hospitals, as kinds of corporate bodies, are the employers of many different
types of professionals and staff. Most notably, medical doctors who have
not yet fully qualified to practice medicine independently in accordance
with their established curriculum, habitually called “residents,” are usually
employed by certain “teaching” hospitals in order to augment patient care
as well as to further the public purpose of training future physicians. They
remain affiliated with a local university medical school program, though
they are not students, but graduates.
These “physicians in training” are placed by the hospital under the supervision
of a fully qualified attending physician (though, it must be remembered that
residents are not medical students: they have graduated from medical school
and have achieved their M.D. designation. They are, generally speaking, far
from ineffectual). The duties and responsibilities of residents can be laid out
somewhat informally, or articulated generally by legislation. The bylaws of
the IWK children’s hospital in Halifax, NS, for example, dictate the general
conduct of residents:
Policy, 3d ed. (Markham: LexisNexis, 2007) at 13.
45
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.
5., s. 92(7)
46
e.g. Queen Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 15, s. 12; Hospitals
Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 208, s. 6; Medical, Dental and Scientific Staff (General) Bylaws, N.S.
Reg. 305/2007 (June 12, 2007)
47
Eldridge v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [Eldridge].
48
Supra note 44 at 14.
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5.13.1 …. Residents shall not be Members of the Medical,
Dental and Scientific Staff Organization.
5.13.2 …. Residents shall be assigned to an appropriate
Department defined in the Rules and Regulations.
5.13.3 …. Residents shall have an Undergraduate/
Postgraduate appointment at the University Faculty of
Medicine or Faculty of Dentistry. Elective students and
residents who are not appointed to training programs at the
University must be registered with the Dean’s office of the
Dalhousie Faculty of Medicine or Dentistry as applicable.
5.13.4 Each … Resident shall be under the supervision of
the appropriate Department Chief, Division Head or Postgraduate Residency Training Program Director (where
such a position exists).
5.13.5 The nature, extent and number of responsibilities,
including patient care responsibilities, assigned to
a… Resident by the above at any given time shall be
commensurate with the… Resident’s demonstrated level of
skill, the educational objectives established for the rotation
or unit in the relevant clinical area from time to time, and
the limits and privileges of the… license held by the…
Resident at the relevant time.49
Residents are placed under the supervision of a senior, fully qualified
physician. The duties and responsibilities of attending physicians, as they
pertain to teaching, are also articulated in the IWK bylaws:
5.12.1 Attending physician… responsibilities shall be as
outlined in the Rules and Regulations pursuant to these
Bylaws.
5.12.2 Each Member of the Medical… Staff shall undertake
Medical, Dental and Scientific Staff (General) Bylaws, N.S. Reg. 305/2007 (June 12, 2007)
s. 5.13
49
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duties as specified by the Chief of the Department or Head
of the Division to which such Member is assigned.
5.12.3 Each attending physician who has teaching
responsibilities shall provide instruction to other Members
of the Medical… Staff, Medical… Students and other
learners as required by the Chief of the Department or
Head of the Division to which such attending physician…
is assigned.50
Attending physicians are generally held in extremely high regard by those
assigned to learn from them. This is not surprising, considering their
superior experience and standing. The expert testimony given in Keilley51
reflects the fact that attending physicians are the duly qualified and ultimately
responsible individuals in this relationship, in addition to being the teachers
and mentors of the junior doctors. Residents quite naturally aspire to achieve
the status of the attending physician:
Medical education is a journey to the top of one totem
pole, only to fall off and land at the bottom of the next.
All physicians have this experience through medical
training… The premedical college student gazes on the first
year medical student thinking “I’ll be there some day.” The
new intern watches a third-year family medicine resident
running a code blue hoping someday to have the same level
of confidence. But above all, every move of the attending
physician will be observed for clues on how to master the
art of family medicine.52
This is not meant to characterize residents as “googley-eyed” admirers
who bungle around while the attending physician practises medicine.
As mentioned above, residents are medical school graduates, and as they
Medical, Dental and Scientific Staff (General) Bylaws, supra note 49, s. 5.12
Supra note 1 ¶ 30.
52
R. John Presutti, “The Art of Teaching,” in Robert L. Bratton, ed., Mayo Clinic’s Complete
Guide for Family Physicians and Residents in Training (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 2000) at
127.
50
51
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progress in their training the skills they acquire and knowledge they display
quite naturally, as in all professions, result in a greater assignment of
responsibility:
As family practice residents move into their second and
third years, the emphasis shifts to micromanagement and
long-term outcome. Differential diagnosis skills should
be well developed. It is during this time that residents can
refine their skills in all areas from patient communication
to procedures. This is also a transition time for residents
who soon will be facing their new positions as family
medicine attending physicians.53
While residents are still residents, they are usually employees of hospitals and
not entitled to act independent of the general supervision of the attending
physicians within whose charge they have been placed. It stands to reason,
however, that residents will be given more and more metaphorical rope the
more senior they are and the more skill and knowledge they demonstrate.
Their position, then, is a rather fluid one.
In contrast, attending physicians are not usually employees of hospitals, but
are instead granted admitting privileges to the hospital’s facilities in order
to effect its purpose. They follow the hospital’s regulations, but are usually
at the same time part of a self-governing medical staff organization within
the hospital.54 They are not paid by the hospital: attending physicians bill
directly to the appropriate provincial health authority.
Both the physician and the resident, though not technically “insured,” are
extremely likely to be protected from having to pay negligence judgments
from the Canadian Medical Protective Association (CMPA).55 If the CMPA
is unable to combat the suit or avoid settlement, it will most likely cover the
Ibid. at 127.
Lahey, supra note 44 at 13. See also Medical, Dental and Scientific Staff (General) Bylaws,
supra note 49, s. 5.13.
55
Donalee Moulton, “Canada said not immune to malpractice insurance ‘crisis’” (2003)
22
:39 Lawyers Wkly. 9(2) (95% of physicians in Canada are members of the CMPA).
53
54

24

Vicarious Liability in Medical Malpractice

2008

cost of the judgment or settlement so long as the physician or resident is a
member. Many hospitals require physicians and residents to be members
of CMPA before they will allow them privileges or employ them.56 The
hospital is also extremely likely to be insured, though through a separate
entity. Even if uninsured, the hospital usually has access to the deep pockets
of the provincial health authority, as its mandate would not normally allow
for it to become insolvent or bankrupt.57
Hospitals, physicians, and residents exist in an extremely unique environment
when it comes to Canadian employment situations. Hospitals are corporate
bodies, created by statute, usually operating not-for-profit. While not
technically government entities, they are effecting a government purpose.
Attending physicians are not employees of hospitals, though they work in
them and are governed by their bylaws. They are not paid by the hospital,
but rather bill the government directly for the patients treated. Residents
are not fully qualified to practice medicine on their own, and must always
operate officially under the supervision of an attending physician. However, as
residents gain seniority, they come to resemble attending physicians more and
more in practice. They are usually employees of the hospital, and paid by it.

III: VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN CANADIAN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW: FROM HILLYER TO KIELLEY

If an attending physician opens her own practice, she will be vicariously
Bernard Dickens, “Chapter 3: Medical Negligence.” in Jocelyn Downie & Timothy
Caulfied & Colleen Flood, eds. Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3d ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2007) at 129.
57
Ibid. at 129. See also Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital (No.2), 120 D.L.R. (3d)
341 (Ont. H.C.J.), where the Ontario Ministry of Health and the CMPA both contributed
to a substantial settlement.
56
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liable for all the torts committed by her office staff, so long as she meets the
legal requirements to be found vicariously liable as set out above in section
I.58 However, a physician who operates out of a hospital through “privileges”
will not be found vicariously liable for the hospital staff e.g. orderlies or
nurses. They are not the employees of the physician, but of the hospital.
This includes residents.59 Were a physician with hospital privileges to give
negligent direction to a nurse, or negligently supervise a resident, she might
be found liable for the harms that resulted, but this would be liability with
fault, not vicarious liability.60
The hospital, as the employer of its staff, easily meets the requirements set
out in section I to be found vicariously liable. Dickens agrees:
If a hospital employee, such as a nurse or radiology
technician is negligent and causes injury to the hospital’s
patient, the hospital will be held legally liable. The patient
is not required to prove that the hospital itself was at fault
in any way.61
The hospital, under the current state of the law in Canada, is not vicariously
liable for the torts of attending physicians. They are not employees, but
independent contractors.62 Strangely enough, despite being quite deeply
“integrated” into the function of the hospital (how would a hospital fulfill
its mandate without doctors?), vicarious liability has never really operated
between the two at common law.
It would seem that their relationship easily passes Lord Denning’s integration
Ellen I. Picard and Gerald B. Robertson, “Chapter 10 – The Doctor’s Liability for the
Acts of Others” in Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1996) at 356-357.
59
Ibid. at 358.
60
Bugden v. Harbour View Hospital et al. [1947] 2 D.L.R. 338 (N.S.S.C.). Further, a
physician is not negligent in presuming that the hospital staff will carry out their duties in
a non-negligent manner.
61
Supra note 56 at 129-130; Vancouver General Hospital v. Fraser Estate [1952] 2 S.C.R. 36.
62
There is, however, a recent trend in Canada for hospitals to employ physicians directly,
for various reasons. See Dickens, supra note 56 at 130.
58
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test, above, from Evans.63 The hospital, through its bylaws, also exercises
considerable control over the physician, including the power to revoke, or
refuse to renew, privileges. These factors notwithstanding, hospitals have
traditionally not been found vicariously liable for the torts of attending
physicians.64
The reasoning behind this may well be due to the fact that hospitals, in
earlier times especially, could not reasonably be expected to directly control
the acts of the physicians in their employ. As Atiyah comments, “how, it was
thought, could a surgeon performing an operation, be treated as the servant
of a hospital when it was evident that no one could tell him how to do it?”65
After showing that the hospital did not negligently hire (or give privileges to)
the surgeon, and provided appropriate equipment, the discussion invariably
leads to questions like: “What more could the hospital reasonably be expected
to have done to prevent the harm?” But this concern is directed towards
liability with fault, not vicarious liability. According to Curry, the factors
that should be considered in determining vicarious liability must relate to
fair compensation and deterrence. We shall return to this common66 point
of confusion shortly.
The classic, and often referred to, case is Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew’s Hospital.67
In that case, a hospital was found not vicariously liable for the negligent acts
of both a physician conducting an operation and the nursing staff under
his supervision. The physician, at common law, could not reasonably be
considered a servant of the hospital due to the impossibility of control. The
nursing staff was also found to be outside of the control of the hospital, and
therefore not legally its servants, for the duration of the operation. During
Supra note 13.
See Evans v. Liverpool [1906] 1 K.B. 160. This case is worthy of note not only because it
establishes the historical lack of vicarious liability found against hospitals for the actions
of physicians, but also because the plaintiff, suspecting his initial suit against the hospital
would fail, attempted to sue in strict liability as per Rylands v. Fletcher (1868), L.R. 3. H.L.
330.
65
Supra note 7 at 88.
66
See Atiyah, supra note 7 at 88: it is not uncommon for courts to blur the line between
reasons for finding direct and vicarious liability.
67
[1909] 2 K.B. 820 (C.A.).
63
64
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that time, they were under the direct control of the surgeon and were
“borrowed servants.”68 The hospital could exercise no direct control, and
therefore the doctrine of respondeat superior could not operate.
It is doubtless that in 1909 the English Court of Appeal was not taking into
account precisely the same policy considerations that the Supreme Court of
Canada was in 1999. However, the underlying themes of fair compensation
and deterrence seem to be present in both. In Hillyer, the concept of
control seems to be directly related to the principle of deterrence. During
the surgery, it was the surgeon who could exercise control, and finding the
hospital vicariously liable for the negligent acts of the nursing staff could
have no deterrent effect upon future harms. Farwell L.J. seems to imply that
this is exactly what occurs in reality:
[A]s soon as the door of the theatre or operating room has
closed on them for the purposes of an operation… they
cease to be under the orders of the defendants, and are at
the disposal and under the orders of the operating surgeon
until the whole operation has been completely finished; the
surgeon is for the time being supreme, and the defendant
[hospital] cannot interfere with or gainsay his orders. This
is well understood, and is indeed essential to the success of
operations; no surgeon would undertake the responsibility
of operations if his orders… were subject to… interference
by the governing body.69
This would also seem to imply that, were the plaintiff to sue the surgeon, he could
be found vicariously liable for the negligence of the nurses and hospital staff in
general. Applying this reasoning to the modern law of vicarious liability may seem
rather ludicrous, considering that modern attending physicians do not in any way
employ hospital staff. When one considers the justifications for vicarious liability
in the first instance, however, this may not be so clear. This phenomenon can be
observed in the cases of Kielley and Considine, mentioned above.
Ibid. at 826.
69 Ibid.
68
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In the 1982 Nova Scotia case Considine, a supervised resident performed
a prostate surgery that resulted in harm to the patient. 70 The patient sued
the resident and the hospital, and later joined the attending physician as
defendant. The court found that none of the defendants’ conduct fell below
the standard of care, and so the action failed. However, the trial judge made
some extremely interesting comments in obiter regarding where he would
have found liability:
It is my opinion that Dr. Ajayi [the resident] was under the
control and direction of Dr. Mack to such an extent and
degree that for the procedures to which this decision is
addressed, Dr. Mack is responsible for Dr. Ajayi… Dr. Mack
accepted Dr. Ajayi as his assistant in this case… Dr. Mack
clearly chose to delegate some or all of the procedures to Dr.
Ajayi… In this way he adopted that which Dr. Ajayi did for
and on his behalf as though Dr. Mack was doing it himself.
I do not know whether Dr. Mack billed full tariff for this
[procedure] to medical services insurance. If he did, then
I would find all the more reason to conclude as I do with
respect to the matter of his responsibility for the acts of
Dr.Ajayi. I am convinced that on the facts of this particular
case Dr. Mack either accepted or must be deemed to have
accepted, or both, the risks inherent in his permitting Dr.
Ajayi to perform all or a part of the surgical procedure on
the male plaintiff. If I had found Dr. Ajayi responsible in
law for loss suffered by the male plaintiff arising out of the
surgical procedures, then I would have had no hesitation in
finding the defendant Mack equally responsible.71
The trial judge was unclear as to whether he would have found vicarious
liability or a breach of a non-delegable duty of care. Taking into account the
rulings in both Hillyer, three quarters of a century before Considine, and
Curry seventeen years after, vicarious liability seems to make a lot of sense.
70
71

Supra note 2.
Ibid. ¶ 16.
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In accordance with Hillyer, the trial judge noted that the attending physician
exercised total control over the resident, despite his being an employee of
the hospital, and was the only legal person in any position to deter negligent
conduct. Taking into account the other justification for vicarious liability
from Curry, viz. fair compensation, the attending physician was likely billing
for the procedure (risk creation = loss bearing). He was also likely (at least, in
contemporary reality) protected from personally having to pay a judgment
by the CMPA (satisfaction/ solvent defendant, and loss spreading). It would
seem that the justifications for vicarious liability as found in Curry support
the trial judge’s obiter comments.
In Keilley,72 however, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal found otherwise:
There is no general principle that doctors are vicariously
liable for the negligence of residents under their
supervision…. The Considine case is among four referred
to by the authors of Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospital
in Canada as being inconsistent or potentially inconsistent
with the established case law. In respect of Considine it was
said that if the decision was based on vicarious liability
(in contrast to the surgeon unreasonably delegating a
duty owed to the patient), it would be inconsistent with
established case law [sic].73
As the courts are often wont to do,74 the NLCA immediately proceeded to
discuss	

    the	

    possibility	

    of	

    ﬁnding	

    liability	

    with	

    fault:
Though there is no employer-employee relationship or
general principle of law upon which to find Dr. Sussex
vicariously liable for Dr. Barrett’s negligence it does not
necessarily follow that a specialist is never held liable for
the actions of a resident under his supervision. Indeed
Supra note 1.
Ibid. ¶ 35.
74
Keilley, ibid. See also: Karderas et al. v. Clow et al. (1972), 32 D.L.R. (3d) 303; McFadyen
et al. v. Harvie et al., [1941] O.R. 90 (Ont. C.A.); Atiyah, supra note 7 at 88.
72
73
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counsel for Dr. Sussex concedes that if Dr. Sussex had
directed Dr. Barrett to do some thing which failed to meet
the required standard of care, Dr. Sussex would be liable.
But, he submits, Dr. Sussex cannot be held liable for Dr.
Barrett’s exercise of his own judgment.75
The NLCA was quite correct: there is no established Canadian case law for
finding an attending physician liable for the negligent acts of a resident, or
any hospital employee. However, it is interesting to note that the justifications
for vicarious liability as found in Curry, coupled with the nature of the
relationship between the attending physician and resident, would seem
to imply otherwise. In practice, the courts have rigidly applied the test for
vicarious liability from section I, above, without taking into account the
actual justifications for the test’s existence at all. Residents are employees
of the hospital; attending physicians are not. So ends the discussion of
liability.

IV: NON-SEQUITUR

The hospital-resident-attending physician triangle causes some significant
problems for the traditional application of vicarious liability. The hospital,
though it ostensibly has considerable control over the general duties of the
attending physician through its bylaws, has no direct control over how she
carries out those duties. The physician is not an employee of the hospital,
but an independent contractor billing the provincial health authority, and
is governed only by the rules of the independent medical staff organization
and their professional self-regulating body (e.g. The College of Physicians
and Surgeons of Nova Scotia).76 The physician directs the conduct of hospital
staff, including residents, in accordance with the hospital bylaws. The resident
75
76

Supra note 1 ¶ 36.
Created by the Medical	

    Act, S.N.S. 1995-96, c. 10.
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is an employee of the hospital, and is paid by it, but is controlled only by the
orders of the attending physician. As the resident becomes more senior, she
acts more and more of her own accord, and begins to more closely resemble
an independent contractor.
In summary, there exists the bizarre situation where the hospital employs
the resident, but exercises no control, and the attending physician controls
the resident, but does not employ her. The current operation of vicarious
liability in the medical malpractice context, then, does not achieve its own
stated objectives.
So far as deterrence is concerned, the resident is deterred from being
negligent by personal liability,77 but the attending physician, not the hospital,
holds further powers of control. The attending physician is deterred from
providing negligent supervision by the possibility of facing personal
liability,78 but faces no further motivation, as she is not vicariously liable for
the acts of the resident. The hospital, though it faces vicarious liability for
the negligence of the resident, is in no position to control her except through
the attending physician, over whom it has only general control through the
bylaws (viz. the assignment of duties). It would seem that vicarious liability
could not possibly motivate deterrence in this context.
The second justification for vicarious liability, fair compensation, would also
seem to be problematic. As mentioned above, all three possible defendants
in our triangle are solvent. The attending physician and resident are likely
protected by the CMPA, and the hospital is either insured, covered by the
provincial government, or both. No matter who commits the initial tort, the
plaintiff will be able to recover, and the loss will be spread.
So far as risk creation is concerned, there may be considerable problems with
saying that any party in this scenario has really “created” the risk. The risk
inherent in the existence of a healthcare facility (within a public healthcare
In accordance with the principles set out in ter Neuzen v. Korn. (1995), 127 D.L.R. (4th)
577 (S.C.C.) [Korn].
78
Ibid.
77
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system) is not so much created by the hospital or the physicians, but the
reality that people get injured and ill, and desire a remedy for this pre-existing
condition: it is the illness, not the hospital, that creates the initial risk.
Now, one could turn to our trucking company scenario and take this claim
to mean that the company could just as easily claim that their enterprise did
not create the risk of the crash, but rather the demand for soda pop cans in
convenience stores across the province did. The company, having not really
created the risk, should not be found vicariously liable.
I would argue that these two situations are in fact quite different. Healthcare,
at least in Canada, is serving a public purpose of critical concern. It is almost
always a heated election issue at any level of government, and as the Canadian
population ages, it will in all probability continue to be so. It would be difficult
to imagine the public being nearly as concerned if suddenly there were no
pop cans available in the province, as if suddenly there were no doctors or
hospitals. I would argue, therefore, that the reality of human experience
is what actually creates the risk in the healthcare context, and even if not,
physicians and hospitals do not fall into the same category of enterprise that
was of concern in London Drugs.79 While entities serving a public purpose
are still generally subject to vicarious liability,80 it is doubtful that any have
control and supervision relationships as unique as those that exist in this
particular healthcare context.
According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Curry, if the two essential principles
that justify vicarious liability are not both present, then vicarious liability should
not be imposed in new situations.81 I would propose that the requirements
necessary to impose vicarious liability in new situations should logically apply just
as equally to those that existed in the past. According to the factors laid out above,
the medical malpractice context does not seem to satisfy the requirements, either
separately or simultaneously, to justify the imposition of vicarious liability.
Supra note 25.
Supra note 4. This principle goes at least as far back as Mersey Docks and Harbour Board
Trustees v. Gibb (1866), L.R. 1 H.L. 93.
81
Supra note 4 ¶ 36.
79
80
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Along the same lines of reasoning in Hillyer and Considine, the closest legal
person that comes to satisfying the principles set out in Curry is actually the
attending physician. After all, she is the only one in a position to deter the
resident from committing negligent acts and, in billing for the procedure,
could be construed as creating the risk and exporting liability for resultant
harms to the resident and hospital. However, imposing vicarious liability
upon the attending physician would not efficiently meet the goal of loss
spreading (as mentioned above, all three parties are either protected or
insured), and, as mentioned above, the argument for risk creation in this
context is extremely weak at best.82
It does not therefore seem appropriate to impose vicarious liability upon
any party within this problem. If one considers the justifications given for
vicarious liability at Canadian law, and applies them to the reality of the
medical malpractice context, it does not follow.

CONCLUSION: WHERE THE BUCK STOPS
There is little doubt that the existing case law supported the Newfoundland
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Keilley. It is worthy of note that had vicarious
liability not been imposed on the hospital in the first instance, the appeal
would never have occurred.83 The resident, having been found negligent,
would have paid the judgment. He would likely have been protected by the
CMPA, and thus would have been solvent. The plaintiff would have recovered
for his loss, the loss would have been spread, and residents everywhere
would continue to be deterred by a combination of concern for professional
There may also be overwhelming policy reasons not to impose vicarious liability upon
teaching physicians. For one, the imposition of such liability may not motivate physicians
to more diligently supervise residents, but rather to simply avoid teaching altogether
(thereby making their PL=0).
83
Presuming, for the purposes of our project, that the hospital would not have tried to
claim that the attending physician should have been vicariously liable for the negligence of
the nursing staff.
82
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reputation, direct liability, and CMPA membership fees. Direct liability, in
the medical malpractice context, could work on its own. The only side effect
would seem to be decreased litigation between the CMPA and the hospital’s
insurer over who would actually pay the judgment.
The law continues to evolve. The relatively recent 2002 case of Jaman Estate
v. Hussain considered the question: could hospitals be found liable with fault
for the acts of physicians, despite meeting the standard of care? 84 In that
case, the Manitoba Court of Appeal considered the impact of Yepremian v.
Scarborough Hospital.85
In Yepremian, the Ontario Court of Appeal found by a 3/2 split decision that
the hospital owed no common law non-delegable duty of care to its patients.
It was the legislature’s, and not the Court’s, place to expand the hospital’s
liability so drastically. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was
granted on this issue, but the case was resolved by a substantial settlement
before being heard.86
In Jaman, the Manitoba Court of Appeal ruled that it may be possible to
find at trial the existence of a non-delegable duty of care owed by a rural
medical clinic to its patients, and so an action based upon this should not
be summarily dismissed. It relied heavily upon the fact that Yepremian,
while not reaching the Supreme Court, was a split decision and, in addition,
resulted in settlement.
If a hospital did owe such a duty, any negligence on the part of its attending
physicians would cause the hospital to be liable with fault. It is difficult to
imagine exactly how a hospital would discharge such a duty, given the reality
of health professionals’ relationships laid out above. There may exist some
overarching policy considerations87 inducing the courts to find hospitals
[2002] M.J. No. 283 (C.A.) [Jaman].
(1980), 20 O.R. (2d) 494 (C.A.) [Yepremian].
86
Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital (No.2) (1981), 31 O.R. (2d) 384, 120 D.L.R.
(3d) 341 (Ont. H.C.J.).
87
Provincial limitation periods, for example, might potentially bar a plaintiff from suing
a physician, or from joining a physician to an action, but not a hospital if it were named
84
85
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(rather than negligent physicians) liable for harms, through either vicarious
liability or non-delegable duties, and thus have them bear the loss.
Indeed, the medical malpractice context carries with it a peculiar feature
when it comes to paying judgments: the loss, with or without vicarious
liability, is already spread. Any medical services required due to the tort are
covered by the plaintiff ’s provincial health plan, and any damages awarded in
court will be paid by either the CMPA (whose funds come from physicians’
salaries), the hospital’s insurer, or by the government directly to support
the hospital: all of these entities are funded, directly or indirectly, by the
public purse. No matter where the loss initially falls, the buck eventually
gets passed, however inefficiently, to the Canadian taxpayer. Perhaps, then,
it does not matter who exactly bears the loss, so long as it is not the innocent
plaintiff. Notwithstanding this potential truth, it still stands to reason that
if a law is to exist, it should at the very least operate in accordance with its
own justifications. For now, vicarious liability, as it exists in Canada and is
applied in the medical malpractice context, does not.

as a defendant in time. See e.g. Limitations of Actions Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c.258, s. 2(1)
(d). Alternatively, it might be that the imposition of liability may encourage physicians to
emigrate, whereas hospitals do not have this option.
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